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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-DuE PROCESS-THE RIGHT TO COUN-
SEL IN A CRIMINAL PRocEEDING.-Defendants, non-residents of the
state of Alabama, were charged with the crime of rape. The arraign-
ment in the state court took place six days after the arrest and the
trial followed after a lapse of a similar period of time. Defendants
were without counsel. The Court designated generally the entire
local bar. Nothing more was ordered with respect to providing
counsel to prepare the defense for the accused. The defendants were
convicted in the trial court and the conviction was upheld by the
Supreme Court of Alabama with but one dissent therefrom.' On
appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States, held, reversed.
The denial of counsel with the customary incidents of consultation
and opportunity to prepare for the trial was a denial of due process
in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.2 Powell et al. v. State
of Alabanta, 53 Sup. Ct. 55 (1932).
The pioblem as to what constitutes "due process" under the
Fourteenth Amendment has received timely and full consideration
elsewhere.3 The modern concept of fundamental rights has its basis
in the past as modified by changing conditions and views. Any
attempt to calculate individual rights must of necessity fail. In the
words of Mr. Justice Holmes, "General propositions do not decide
concrete cases. The decision will depend on a judgment or intuition
more subtle than any articulate major premise." 4 It is one thing to
declare that an individual is not entitled to an indictment by a grand
jury as a prerequisite to prosecution by a state for murder because
the Fourteenth Amendment contains no such express guarantee; 5 it
is quite another thing to deprive him of an opportunity to employ or
have assigned counsel to defend and to be allotted sufficient time for
the preparation of such defense. It is not true, as generally believed,
that it is a denial of due process to take away some right once enjoyed
as a protective measure. Thus a hearing to determine the rights of
an individual may be entrusted to an executive officer or administra-
tive board and there need not be any judicial proceeding for that
purpose; 6 the state may repeal a statute of limitation and thereby
1 Chief Justice Anderson dissented.
2 Two other points were raised on appeal: (1) They were not given a fair,
impartial and deliberate trial; * * * (3) They. were tried before juries from
which qualified members of their own race were systematically excluded.
'Thomas B. Hill, Jr., The Federal Constitution and the Fourteenth Amend-
ment (1926) 1 ALA. L. J. 68; Nesbitt, Due Process of Law and Opinion (1926)
26 CoL. L. REv. 23; Finkelstein, From Mimn v. Illinois to Tyson v. Banton-A
Study it the Judicial Process (1927) 27 COL. L. REv. 769; Hough, Due Process
of Law---Today (1919) 32 HARv. L. REv. 218; Warren, The New Liberty
Under the Fourteenth Amenidment (1926) 39 HARv. L. REv. 431; Brown, Due
Process of Law, Police Power and the Supreme Court (1927) 40 HARv. L.
REv. 943; Laylin and Tuttle, Due Process and Puzishment (1922) 20 MicH.
L. REv. 614; Willis, Due Process of Law Under the United States Constitution(1926) 74 U. OF PA. L. REv. 331.
'Lochner v. New York, 198 U. S. 45, 76, 25 Sup. Ct. 539, 547 (1905).
'Hurtado v. California, 110 U. S. 516, 4 Sup. Ct. 111 (1884).
'U. S. v. Ju Toy, 198 U. S. 253, 25 Sup. Ct. 299 (1905).
RECENT DECISIONS
revive a debt that had already been barred; 7 the state may change
the number of jurors for a criminal case or abolish the jury system
entirely.8 All these acts are not deemed a denial of due process.
Apparently the absence of an express declaration in the Amendment
itself granting a particular right 9 is no longer to be regarded as the
determining factor. The suggested basis is, if "the right involved is
of such a character that it cannot be denied without violating those
'fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of
all our civil and political institutions,'" 10 the Court will be moved to
declare that it is a denial of due process.
The points set forth on appeal might have justified a decision on
other grounds.11 Perhaps the Court feared the results of an exten-
sion of the doctrine stated in Moore v. Dempsey 2 or that the facts
surrounding the trial of the instant case were insufficient to render it
amenable to the rule enunciated therein. Sufficient it is for the pres-
ent that the limitations and definitions of the due process clause aptly
referred to in the phrase "convenient vagueness" 13 is justification
for the Court in assuming jurisdiction of a similar cause and in
acting as a check on this phase of criminal procedure, resting, as it
does almost exclusively, with each state.14
A. K. B.
Campbell v. Holt, 115 U. S. 620, 6 Sup. Ct. 209 (1885).
8Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U. S. 581, 20 Sup. Ct. 488 (1898). For a further
consideration of changes in the adjective law as affecting due process see
Note (1931) 5 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 226.
' Hurtado v. California, mtpra note 5.
'0 Instant case.
' Supra note 1.
'2261 U. S. 86, 43 Sup. Ct. 265 (1923).
' Editorial by Felix Frankfurter appearing in the N. Y. Times, Nov. 13,
1932, pp. E 1, 2. Professor Frankfurter stated: "The words of the amend-
ment are words of 'convenient vagueness,' definable only by the cumulative
process of judicial inclusion and exclusion. In matters affecting property rights,
and notably the regulation of economic enterprise, they have come to be the
foundation of a large body of doctrine often interposing irksome barriers to
restrictive legislation. Only last year they served Mr. Justice Sutherland in
the famous Oklahoma ice case [New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U. S.
262 (1932)] as a touchstone for the invalidity of a statute which authorized the
State Corporation Commission to deny to any person the right to enter the
business of manufacturing ice in a community where in its opinion the existing
facilities made such entrance injurious to the public. Now, in the hands of the
same Justice, they return to their more immediate purpose of protecting black
men from oppressive and unequal treatment by whites."
' Mr. Chief Justice Hughes, Mr. Justices Sutherland, Cardozo, Stone,
Brandeis, Roberts and Van Devanter join in the prevailing opinion. It is inter-
esting to note that Mr. Justice Sutherland, who dissented in Moore v. Dempsey,
supra note 12, wrote the prevailing opinion in the instant case.
